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This paper models a firm's rollover risk generated by conflict of interest between debt and equity holders.
When the firm faces losses in rolling over its maturing debt, its equity holders are willing to absorb
the losses only if the option value of keeping the firm alive justifies the cost of paying off the maturing
debt. Our model shows that both deteriorating market liquidity and shorter debt maturity can exacerbate
this externality and cause costly firm bankruptcy at higher fundamental thresholds. Our model provides
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The credit crisis of 2007/2008 highlights the severe rollover risk faced by ￿nancial institutions.
Since ￿nancial institutions rely heavily on short-term debt to ￿nance their illiquid long-term
investment positions, they face the risk that they might not be able to roll over maturing
debt when market conditions deteriorate, either for fundamental or liquidity reasons. In
fact, failure to roll over maturing debt is the direct cause of the collapses of both Bear
stearns and Lehman Brothers.1 There is now an emerging literature analyzing rollover risk.
Morris and Shin (2004, 2009) study rollover risk through a coordination problem between
short-term creditors. He and Xiong (2009) show that fear of a ￿rm￿ s future rollover risk can
lead creditors to preemptively run ahead of others. Acharya, Gale, and Yorulmazer (2009)
show that when current asset owners and future buyers are all short of capital, high rollover
frequency can lead to diminishing debt capacity of risky assets. These models all rely on
an implicit assumption that ￿rms are constrained from raising more equity during ￿nancial
distress. However, this assumption is unrealistically strong as many ￿rms were able to raise
equity despite the recent credit crisis.
In this paper, we analyze the e⁄ect of rollover risk on ￿rms￿credit risk in a setting where
￿rms can freely raise equity at market prices to absorb losses from rolling over maturing debt.
Our model shows that despite this additional source of ￿nancing, ￿rms are still exposed to
rollover risk because of the intrinsic con￿ ict of interest between equity and debt holders.
When a ￿rm faces a large loss from rolling over its maturing debt, any equity injection
represents a bailout of maturing debt holders at the expense of equity holders. Equity holders
are willing to do so to the extent that the equity value is positive, i.e., the option value of
keeping the ￿rm alive justi￿es the cost of absorbing the rollover losses. Our emphasis of this
con￿ ict is consistent with the observation that during the recent crisis many ￿nancial ￿rms
paid a substantial amount of dividends despite their ￿nancial distress and angry creditors;
see, e.g., Scharfstein and Stein (2008). It also echoes Flannery (2005) and Du¢ e (2009), who
highlight debt overhang as a crucial obstacle to recapitalizing banks and ￿nancial institutions
in the aftermath of various historic ￿nancial crises, as well as the recent credit crisis.
We build on the structural credit risk model of Leland (1994, 1998) and Leland and Toft
(1996). Ideal for our research question, this framework endogenously determines a ￿rm￿ s
credit risk jointly with its equity valuation. Speci￿cally, we allow a ￿rm in Leland and Toft
(1996) to use a debt structure mixed with ￿xed fractions of long-term and short-term debt.
For each class of debt, the maturities of individual bonds are uniformly spread out over time.
1See Brunnermeier (2009), Du¢ e (2009), Gorton (2009) and Krishnamurthy (2009) for comprehensive
descriptions of the recent ￿nancial crisis.
2When a bond matures, the ￿rm issues a new bond with the same face value and maturity
to replace it at market prices. As the bond price ￿ uctuates over time, the ￿rm faces rollover
gains/losses, which are absorbed by its equity holders. In other words, rollover gains are
paid out to the equity holders, while losses are paid o⁄ by issuing more equity at market
prices. The equity price is determined by the ￿rm￿ s fundamental and expected future rollover
gains/losses. The ￿rm defaults endogenously when the equity value drops to zero.
Additionally, we incorporate an illiquid bond market into our model by assuming that
investors need to pay a proportional cost when selling a bond, and that the cost for selling a
long-term bond is higher than that for selling a short-term bond.2 To capture the idea that
investors can internalize the e⁄ect of market illiquidity by self-selecting the most appropriate
bonds for themselves based on their liquidity needs, we follow Amihud and Mendelson (1986)
by allowing two types of bond investors. Type-H investors are more likely to liquidate their
bond positions by exogenous liquidity shocks, while type-L investors are less likely. In equi-
librium, type-H investors self-select to hold the more liquid short-term bonds, while type-L
investors are indi⁄erent between holding the short-term and long-term bonds. The equilib-
rium liquidity premia of these bonds are not only determined by their marginal investors￿
expected future trading costs, but also by additional premia required to compensate them
for forgoing the returns that they could earn from holding other bonds.
Our model allows us to analyze two key factors￿ market liquidity and debt maturity￿ in
driving the credit risk of many ￿nancial institutions in the recent credit crisis. We show
that, even in the absence of any constraint on the ￿rm￿ s ability to raise more equity, the
deterioration of bond market liquidity can cause the ￿rm to default at a higher fundamental
threshold due to the surge in the ￿rm￿ s rollover losses. In other words, the deterioration of
market liquidity increases not only the liquidity premium of the ￿rm￿ s bonds, but also its
default probability. This mechanism originates from the intrinsic con￿ ict of interest between
debt and equity holders, and is similar in spirit to the debt overhang problem coined by
Myers (1977). Equity holders have to bear all rollover losses to avoid bankruptcy, while
maturing debt holders get paid in full. This unequal sharing of losses makes the equity value
sensitive to the drop in bond prices and ultimately leads to costly bankruptcy at a high
fundamental threshold. The premature bankruptcy re￿ ects an important form of externality
within the ￿rm: equity holders only consider their own value when choosing whether to
default, even though the bankruptcy is costly to both equity and debt holders.3
2These assumptions are consistent with the recent empirical studies of corporate bond market liquidity,
e.g., Bessembinder, Maxwell, and Venkataraman (2006), Edwards, Harris, and Piwowar (2007), Mahanti et
al (2008), and Bao, Pan, and Wang (2009).
3This externality complements other types of externalities in debt crises. For example, when some
3Shorter debt maturity can further exacerbate this externality. As we observed in the
recent credit crisis, ￿nancial ￿rms increasingly rely on overnight commercial paper and repo
transactions, two extreme forms of short-term debt ￿nancing, to fund their investment posi-
tions. At this rapid rollover frequency, the equity holders are forced to immediately absorb
any loss incurred to the ￿rm￿ s debt ￿nancing. This in￿ exibility reduces their option value
of keeping the ￿rm alive and thus causes the ￿rm to default at a higher fundamental level.
Our model thus highlights ￿rms￿debt maturity structure as another important determinant
of credit risk, in addition to the widely recognized leverage e⁄ect.
The standard credit risk models, following Merton (1974), focus on ￿rms￿insolvency risk,
i.e., the risk that ￿rms￿fundamental values could fall below their liability levels. However,
a growing number of empirical studies, e.g., Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and Martin (2001),
Longsta⁄, Mithal, and Neis (2005), Ericsson and Renault (2006), and Chen, Lesmond, and
Wei (2007), ￿nd that liquidity is an important factor in ￿rms￿credit spreads. While these
studies typically interpret this ￿nding as a liquidity-premium e⁄ect,4 our model highlights
that through the rollover-risk channel, an increase in liquidity premium also feeds back to
￿rms￿endogenous default thresholds and causes higher default probabilities. This implication
cautions against the common practice of decomposing credit spreads as simple sums of default
premia and liquidity premia, and justi￿es the large liquidity-premium e⁄ect documented in
the empirical studies. Moreover, it suggests time-varying market liquidity as an explanation
for the common latent factors discovered by Du¢ e et al (2009) in ￿rms￿default probabilities.
The profound impact of market liquidity on ￿rms￿default risk illustrated by our model
justi￿es the increasingly prevalent view among industry practitioners that credit ratings are
an inadequate measure of credit risk. Rating agencies assign credit ratings largely based
on ￿rms￿insolvency risk. In contrast, the 2008 Credit Assessment Guidelines, jointly issued
by European Fund and Asset Management Association, European Securitization Forum,
and Investment Management Association, caution against over-reliance of asset managers
on credit ratings because of their failure to account for other important factors, such as
liquidity risk:
￿Credit ratings are incomplete descriptions of riskiness. Credit ratings may be
assessments of creditworthiness, but they are not assessments of the level of liq-
creditors of a ￿rm choose to run on the ￿rm, their decision imposes a cost on other creditors by making
the ￿rm more likely to fail, e.g., He and Xiong (2009). Asset liquidations of some market participants also
impose a cost on other participants holding the same assets, because the liquidations suppress the asset
prices and thus weaken the ￿nancing capacities of the assets for other participants, e.g., Brunnermeier and
Pedersen (2009) and Lorenzoni (2008).
4The only exception is Ericsson and Renault (2006), who develop a model to show that market illiquidity
could also a⁄ect the renegotiation between debt and equity holders upon bankruptcy.
4uidity, market or rating volatility risk nor should ratings be exclusively relied on
for valuation purposes.￿
To make credit ratings a more e¢ cient measure of credit risk, our model also suggests that
they need to incorporate the so-called ￿maturity risk￿ , i.e., an e⁄ect generated by ￿rms￿debt
maturity structure on their credit risk, which we will discuss in Section 5.
Our model also features separate clienteles for the long-term and short-term bonds, en-
dogenously determined by investors￿heterogeneous liquidity needs and bonds￿heterogeneous
trading costs. This is consistent with a common observation that the markets for bonds with
di⁄erent maturities are highly segmented with di⁄erent investor clienteles. Furthermore, our
model highlights a rich set of channels for liquidity shocks to spill across these di⁄erent debt
market segments. For example, when type-H investors (who hold short-term bonds in equi-
librium) become exposed to a higher probability of liquidity shocks, the liquidity premium
of the short-term bonds rises. This, in turn, causes the liquidity premium of the long-term
bonds to rise because the type-L investors￿opportunity cost also rises with the liquidity
premium of the short-term bonds. The increased liquidity premia of both short-term and
long-term bonds also push up the ￿rm￿ s endogenous bankruptcy threshold, through which
the credit spreads of the long-term bonds rise further.
Our model provides a new explanation for the widely observed ￿ ight-to-quality phenom-
enon: after major market liquidity disruptions, the prices of low quality bonds drop much
more than those of high quality bonds. It is intuitive that a liquidity breakdown, by pushing
down bond prices and raising ￿rms￿endogenous default thresholds, has a greater impact on
the credit spreads and default probabilities of ￿rms with weaker fundamentals, because they
are closer to the default boundary. In contrast with the existing explanations of this phe-
nomenon based on investors￿investment constraints and preferences, e.g., Vayanos (2004),
He and Krishnamurthy (2008), and Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2008), our model predicts
that a surge in investor demand for market liquidity leads to not only higher liquidity premia
in bond prices, but also higher bond default probabilities.
In our model, there are two opposing forces in determining a ￿rm￿ s optimal maturity
structure. On one hand, more short-term debt leads to a higher expected bankruptcy cost
because of increased rollover risk and higher future bankruptcy probability. On the other
hand, short-term debt has a lower ￿nancing cost, which is consistent both with the aforemen-
tioned empirical ￿nding that short-term bonds tend to be more liquid and with the theoretical
argument that short-term debt is less information sensitive and thus su⁄ers less from adverse-
selection problems, e.g., Gorton and Pennacchi (1990). Our model suggests that ￿rms with
lower asset volatility, higher bankruptcy recovery rates, and higher secondary-market debt
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and future ￿nancial stability is di⁄erent from the existing theories of optimal debt maturity
based on the disciplinary role of short-term debt in preventing managers￿asset substitution,
e.g., Flannery (1994) and Leland (1998), and the theories based on private information of
borrowers about their future credit ratings, e.g., Flannery (1986) and Diamond (1991). A
recent paper by Diamond and He (2010) emphasizes the trade-o⁄ between short-term and
long-term debt overhang, where investment plays a crucial role.
Our analysis shows that debt maturity structure should be used as part of a ￿rm￿ s
liquidity management strategy. Despite its higher cost, long-term debt gives the ￿rm the
￿ exibility to delay realizing ￿nancial losses in adverse states, in which either market liquidity
or the ￿rm￿ s fundamental deteriorates. This bene￿t is analogous to the role of cash reserves,
the standard tool for risk management, e.g., Holmstrom and Tirole (2001) and Bolton, Chen,
and Wang (2009). This implication of our model also echoes Brunnermeier and Yogo (2009),
who argue that ￿rms should shift to long-term debt as their fundamentals deteriorate.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model setting. We derive the
debt and equity valuation and the ￿rm￿ s endogenous bankruptcy boundary in Section 3.
Section 4 discusses the e⁄ects of market liquidity on the ￿rm￿ s credit risk, while Section 5
focuses on the e⁄ects of debt maturity. We discuss optimal maturity structure in Section 6.
Section 7 concludes the paper. Appendix A provides the technical proofs, and Appendix B
provides an extended model to analyze a temporary liquidity crisis.
2 The Model
We build on the structural credit risk model of Leland and Toft (1996) with two additional
features. First, the ￿rm uses a mix of short-term and long-term bonds, in addition to
equity, to ￿nance its operations. Second, and more importantly, bond markets are illiquid.
The short-term and long-term bonds have di⁄erent trading costs, and there are two types of
investors facing di⁄erent liquidity shock intensities. Our setting is generic and applies to both
￿nancial and non-￿nancial ￿rms, although the e⁄ects illustrated by our model are stronger
for ￿nancial ￿rms because they tend to have higher leverage and shorter debt maturity.
2.1 Firm Asset




= (r ￿ ￿)dt + ￿dZt; (1)
6where r is the constant risk-free rate in this economy, ￿ is the ￿rm￿ s constant cash payout
rate, ￿ is the constant asset volatility, and fZt : 0 ￿ t < 1g is a standard Brownian motion.
Throughout the paper, we refer to Vt as the ￿rm fundamental.5
When the ￿rm goes bankrupt, we assume that creditors can only recover a fraction ￿
of the ￿rm￿ s asset value from liquidation. The liquidation loss 1 ￿ ￿ can be interpreted in
di⁄erent ways, such as the loss from selling the ￿rm￿ s real asset to second-best users, loss
of customers because of the bankruptcy, asset ￿re-sale losses, legal fees, etc. An important
issue to keep in mind is that the liquidation loss represents a deadweight loss to both debt
and equity holders ex ante, but is ex post borne only by debt holders.
2.2 Stationary Debt Structure
The ￿rm maintains two classes of debt with maturities m1 and m2, respectively. Without
loss of generality, we let class-1 debt to have a shorter maturity, i.e., m1 < m2: Each class
of debt is identical to the one studied in Leland and Toft (1996). At each moment in time,
class-i debt has a constant principal Pi outstanding and a constant annual coupon payment
of Ci, where i = 1 or 2. The expiration of each class of debt is uniformly spread out across
time. That is, during a time interval (t;t + dt); a fraction 1
midt of class-i debt matures and
needs to be rolled over. Given the shorter maturity of class-1 debt, it has to be rolled over
at a higher frequency 1=m1.
To focus on the ￿rm￿ s debt maturity structure and liquidity e⁄ects, we take the ￿rm￿ s
total debt principal P =
P2
i=1 Pi and total coupon payment C =
P2
i=1 Ci as given. By
taking the leverage level as given, we ignore many interesting issues related to the tradeo⁄
between tax bene￿ts and bankruptcy cost, which are analyzed by Leland (1994) and other
following work such as Goldstein, Ju, and Leland (2001), Strebulaev (2007), and He (2009).
For simplicity, we also assume that the principals and coupon payments of the two debt
classes are in proportion:
Ci = ￿iC; Pi = ￿iP; (2)
where ￿i represents the fraction of class-i debt, with ￿1 + ￿2 = 1.
Furthermore, following the Leland framework, we assume that the ￿rm can commit to a
stationary debt structure denoted by (C;P;m1;m2;￿1;￿2): That is, the ￿rm always main-
5As in Leland (1994), we treat the unlevered ￿rm value process fVt : 0 ￿ t < 1g as the exogenously
given state variable to focus on the e⁄ects of market liquidity and debt maturity. In our context, this
approach is equivalent to directly modeling the ￿rm￿ s exogenous cash ￿ ow process f￿Vt : 0 ￿ t < 1g as
the state variable (i.e., the so-called EBIT model advocated by Goldstein, Ju, and Leland (2001)). For
instance, Hackbarth, Miao, and Morellec (2006) use this EBIT model framework to analyze the e⁄ects of
macroeconomic conditions on ￿rms￿credit risk.
7tains the initially speci￿ed debt level represented by C and P, and the maturity structure
speci￿ed by (m1;m2;￿1;￿2): Thus, when a bond matures, the ￿rm replaces it by issuing a
new bond with identical maturity, principal value, coupon rate and seniority.
At each instant of time, there exists a continuum of class-i bonds in the ￿rm with re-
maining time-to-maturity ￿ ranging from 0 to mi: We measure these bonds by mi units.
















These bonds only di⁄er in the time-to-maturity ￿ 2 [0;mi]. Denote by di (Vt;￿) the value of
one unit of class-i bond as a function of the ￿rm fundamental Vt and its time-to-maturity ￿.
The two classes of debt have the same priority in dividing the ￿rm￿ s assets during bank-
ruptcy, i.e., the ￿rm￿ s liquidation value is divided among all debt holders on a pro rata
basis. This assumption simpli￿es complication that long-term bonds are often secured by
￿rm assets in reality. We believe this simpli￿cation is innocuous to our main results.
2.3 Debt Rollover and Endogenous Bankruptcy
When the ￿rm pays o⁄maturing bonds by issuing new bonds, the ￿ uctuation in bond prices
generates a rollover gain/loss, which needs to be absorbed by equity holders. Speci￿cally,
over a short time interval (t;t + dt), the net cash ￿ ow to equity holders (omitting dt) is
NCt = ￿Vt ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)C +
2 P
i=1
[di (Vt;mi) ￿ pi]: (5)
The ￿rst term is the ￿rm￿ s cash payout. The second term is the after-tax coupon payment,
where ￿ denotes the marginal corporate tax rate. The third term captures the rollover
gain/loss when the ￿rm pays o⁄ maturing bonds by issuing new bonds at market prices.
In this transaction, dt units of both class-1 and class-2 bonds mature. The maturing class-
i bonds require a principal payment of pidt: The market value of the newly issued bonds
with identical principal value and maturity mi is di (Vt;mi)dt, which depends on the ￿rm
fundamental Vt and bond maturity mi: When the bond value di (Vt;mi)dt drops, the equity
holders have to absorb the rollover loss
P2
i=1 [di (Vt;mi) ￿ pi]dt to prevent bankruptcy.
To highlight the role of debt market illiquidity which is introduced in the next section, we
assume that the ￿rm can freely raise additional equity to pay for the rollover loss and coupon
8payments without any friction, as long as the equity value remains positive.6;7 In other words,
equity holders have the option to keep servicing the debt (coupons and principals) in order
to maintain the right to collect the future cash ￿ ows generated by the ￿rm. Bankruptcy
occurs endogenously when the ￿rm fundamental drops to a critical threshold VB at which
equity value becomes zero. At this point, equity holders are no longer willing to absorb the
rollover shortfalls by injecting more capital to meet coupon and principal payments, and
the ￿rm goes bankrupt. Then, the short-term and long-term bond holders divide the ￿rm
liquidation value ￿VB on a pro rata basis.
Under the stationary debt structure speci￿ed earlier, the ￿rm￿ s bankruptcy boundary VB
is constant, which we will derive in the next section. As in any trade-o⁄ theory, bankruptcy
involves a dead-weight loss. Endogenous bankruptcy is a re￿ ection of the con￿ ict of interest
between debt and equity holders: when the ￿rm fundamental is weak and bond prices are
low, equity holders are not willing to bear the rollover losses to avoid the deadweight loss of
bankruptcy. This situation resembles the debt-overhang problem suggested by Myers (1977),
as equity holders voluntarily discontinue the ￿rm by refusing to subsidize the maturing debt
holders.
2.4 Secondary Bond Markets
We adopt a bond market structure similar to that in Amihud and Mendelson (1986). There
are two types of bond investors, type-H and type-L. The two types di⁄er in their demands for
market liquidity. Each type-H investor is exposed to an idiosyncratic liquidity shock, which
arrives according to a Poisson occurrence with intensity ￿H: Upon the arrival of the liquidity
shock, the bond investor has to exit by selling his bond holding in the secondary market. Each
type-L investor is also exposed to an idiosyncratic liquidity shock, which arrives according to
a Poisson occurrence with intensity ￿L: The liquidity shocks are independent across investors.
We let ￿H > ￿L, i.e., the type-H investors have greater liquidity needs than type-L investors.
Furthermore, we assume that type-H investors arrive at the market with Poisson intensity ￿H
and type-L investors arrive with intensity ￿L: We can intuitively interpret type-H investors
as ￿nancial institutions facing higher redemption shocks from their investors, such as open-
end mutual funds, and type-L investors as institutions with more secured funding, such as
6This assumption is just for illustration and is by no means realistic. In fact, it is arguable that due to
informational reasons, debt ￿nancing su⁄ers from fewer frictions than equity ￿nancing. Besides, we broadly
interpret equity issuance to include private placement, which is less vulnerable to informational problems.
7The new ￿nancing does not need to be equity, and just needs to be junior to existing debt. More
speci￿cally, as in the Leland (1994) framework, we can assume that strict bond covenants prevent the ￿rm
from increasing the amount of newly issued bonds with equal seniority to existing bonds (as an e⁄ort to
reduce the rollover losses), because such an increase necessarily hurts the existing debt holders.
9hedge funds and closed-end mutual funds.
When an investor su⁄ers a liquidity shock, he sells his bond to the market maker at a
fractional cost. The cost for a class-i bond is a fraction ￿i of the bond value. In other words,
the investor only recovers a fraction 1 ￿ ￿i of the bond value. We shall broadly interpret
this cost either as a market impact of trade, e.g., Kyle (1985), or as a bid-ask spread, e.g.,
Amihud and Mendelson (1986).
As documented by a series of empirical papers, e.g., Bessembinder, Maxwell, and Venkatara-
man (2006), Edwards, Harris, and Piwowar (2007), Mahanti et al (2008), and Bao, Pan, and
Wang (2009), the secondary markets for corporate bonds are highly illiquid. The illiquidity
is re￿ ected by a large bid-ask spread that bond investors have to pay in trading with dealers,
as well as a potential price impact of the trade. Edwards, Harris, and Piwowar (2007) show
that the average e⁄ective bid-ask spread on corporate bonds ranges from 8 basis points for
large trades to 150 basis points for small trades. Bao, Pan, and Wang (2009) estimate that
the average e⁄ective trading cost, which incorporates bid-ask spread, price impact and other
factors, ranges from 74 to 221 basis points depending on the trade size. There is also large
variation across di⁄erent bonds with the same trade size. In particular, Mahanti et al (2008)
and Bao, Pan, and Wang (2009) document an increasing pattern of the net trading cost with
respect to bond maturity (the sum of bond age and time-to-maturity). This ￿nding suggests
that short-term debt is more liquid than long-term debt.8 Thus, we impose that ￿1 < ￿2:
When an investor, either type H or L; arrives at the market, he buys one unit of bonds
from the market maker. The investor can specify the class of the bond, i.e., class 1 or 2,
but not the time-to-maturity of the bond. The bond is randomly chosen from the market
maker￿ s inventory and could have any time-to-maturity from 0 to mi (for class i). Given
the arrival and exit rates of each type of investors, standard results imply that the expected
number of type-H investors is ￿H=￿H and that of type-L investors is ￿L=￿L: Because type-L
investors have lower liquidity needs, it is more e¢ cient for type-L investors to hold the less
liquid long-term bonds. To make the analysis interesting, we assume that the number of
type-L investors is su¢ cient for holding the long-term bonds but insu¢ cient for absorbing
all of the long-term and short-term bonds. We also assume that there is a large set of type-
H investors, who are able to absorb all of the short-term bonds in a competitive fashion.
Furthermore, both investors can invest in a risk-free bond, which o⁄ers a constant return of r
without trading cost. The risk-free rate r provides the basis for investors to evaluate returns
8Intuitively, the default probabilities of long-term bonds are usually higher than those of short-term
bonds. As a result, there is more uncertainty in valuing long-term bonds. This in turn makes long-term
bonds more exposed to asymmetric information problems between market participants, e.g., Gorton and
Pennacchi (1990), which tend to make long-term bonds less liquid.
10of the long-term and short-term bonds issued by the ￿rm. While we focus on analyzing the
bonds issued by one ￿rm, it should be clear that there are many similar bonds issued by
di⁄erent ￿rms in the market. As a result, the default of one ￿rm does not a⁄ect the bond
market equilibrium.
The bond issuance cost in the primary markets tends to be much lower than the trading
cost in the secondary markets. Issuing commercial paper through dealers usually costs about
5 basis points.9 While the average cost of raising capital through long-term debt is about
220 basis points, e.g., Lee, Lochhead, and Ritter (1996), the e⁄ective cost when spread out
across the debt maturity, which is typically 5￿10 years, is still low relative to the secondary
market trading cost. Thus, we ignore issuance costs in the model.10
In summary, our model captures the bond-market liquidity with four parameters: liq-
uidity shock arrival intensities ￿H and ￿L; which represent the liquidity demands of the two
types of bond investors; and bid-ask spreads ￿1 and ￿2, which represent the illiquidity of
the short-term and long-term bonds. We derive an equilibrium in which type-L investors
are the marginal investor of the less liquid long-term bonds, while the type-H investors are
the marginal investors in the more liquid short-term bonds. In our later analysis, we use an
unexpected rise in the value of ￿H to analyze the e⁄ects of a surge in liquidity premium after
a market disruption on the credit spreads of the long-term and short-term bonds. We focus
on ￿H because institutions with less secured ￿nancing, such as open-end mutual funds, are
more exposed to market disruptions.
3 Valuation and Bankruptcy Boundary
In this section, we derive the debt and equity valuation and the ￿rm￿ s endogenous bankruptcy
boundary.
3.1 Debt Market Equilibrium
We ￿rst derive the debt market equilibrium, in which the type-L and type-H investors are the
marginal investors of the short-term and long-term bonds, respectively. In this subsection,
we take the ￿rm￿ s bankruptcy boundary VB as given.
Recall that di (Vt;￿;VB) is the value of one unit of class-i bonds with time-to-maturity
9See the Wikipedia website at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Commercial_paper for more background
information on commercial paper.
10It is easy to incorporate issuance costs in our model. Of course, the presence of issuance costs favors
long-term debt over short-term debt, as short-term debt requires more frequent rollovers, e.g., Dangl and
Zechner (2007).















@V 2 + ci: (6)
The left-hand side ridi is the required (dollar) return from the bond. As we will show
in Proposition 1, in equilibrium the required rate of return ri is constant for both types
of bonds and higher than the risk-free interest rate r. The di⁄erence ri ￿ r represents
a liquidity premium, which, as we will show shortly, consists of two components. One
component compensates the bond￿ s marginal investor for his expected future trading cost;
the other for his opportunity cost of capital.
There are four terms on the right-hand side, capturing expected changes in the bond
value caused by the change in the time-to-maturity (the ￿rst term), the ￿ uctuation in the
￿rm￿ s asset value Vt (the second and third terms), and the coupon payment (the fourth
term).
Required Bond Returns We now give a proposition for the expected returns of the
short-term and long-term bonds.
Proposition 1 Suppose that the number of type-L investors is su¢ cient for holding the
long-term bonds but insu¢ cient for absorbing all of the long-term and short-term bonds,
and that the number of type-H investors is su¢ cient for absorbing the short-term bonds.
Further suppose that ￿L > ￿H￿1; which guarantees that the type-L investors￿value function
is bounded in equilibrium. Then, type-H investors only hold the short-term bonds and are
the marginal investors in these bonds with a required return of
r1 = r + ￿H￿1: (7)
Type-L investors are the marginal investors in the long-term bonds and are indi⁄erent be-
tween holding the long-term and short-term bonds. Their required return from the long-term
bonds is
r2 = r + ￿H￿1 +
￿2 ￿ ￿1
1 ￿ ￿1
(￿L ￿ ￿H￿1): (8)
This proposition is in the same spirit as the endogenous liquidity clienteles derived in
Amihud and Mendelson (1986), although the derivation is more involved due to the com-
plication in dealing with re-investment of coupon and principal payments.11 Due to their
11In the setting of Amihud and Mendelson (1986), assets pay constant dividends and, as a result, always
trade at constant prices. Since investors in their model always consume the dividends, there is no re-
investment problem.
12heterogeneous liquidity needs, the lower (higher) liquidity needs of type-L (type-H) investors
make them the more e¢ cient holder of the less (more) liquid long-term (short-term) bonds.
In equilibrium, the limited number of type-L investors implies that type-L (type-H) investors
are the marginal investors in the long-term (short-term) bonds.
Since there is a large number of type-H investors, they only earn an expected return of
r on their capital by holding the more liquid short-term bonds. In other words, the type-H
investors￿outside option is investing in the risk-free bonds with return r. This implies that
the required return of the short-term bonds r1 is simply the risk-free rate r plus a premium
￿H￿1; which compensates the type-H investors for their expected future trading cost.
The reasoning for type-L investors is more interesting. It is important to observe that
type-L investors, who are the marginal investors in long-term bonds, have a better outside
option than that o⁄ered by the risk-free bond; they can invest in short-term bonds. Since
they have lower liquidity needs than type-H investors, type-L investors can earn a higher
expected return than r by investing in short-term bonds. As a result, the required return
of the long-term bonds needs to compensate the type-L investors￿forgone opportunity from
investing in the short-term bonds, in addition to the risk-free rate r and the expected future
trading cost of long-term bonds ￿L￿2. According to equation (8), this additional premium
is given by
r2 ￿ (r + ￿L￿2) =
1 ￿ ￿2
1 ￿ ￿1
￿1 (￿H ￿ ￿L) > 0:
Individual Bond Value We have two boundary conditions to pin down the bond prices
based on equation (6). At the bankruptcy boundary VB, the bond holders share the ￿rm￿ s







￿i￿VB; for all ￿ 2 [0;mi]: (9)
When ￿ = 0, the bond matures and the bond holder gets the principal value pi:
di (Vt;0;VB) = pi, for all Vt > VB. (10)
Similar to Leland and Toft (1996), we can solve for the individual bond value di (Vt;￿;VB)















































































2 dy is the cumulative standard normal distribution.
Bond Yield The bond yield is typically computed as the equivalent return on a bond
conditional on it being held to maturity without default or trading. Given the bond price









where the right-hand side is the price of a bond with a constant cash ￿ ow ci over time and
a principal payment pi at the bond maturity, conditional on no default or trading before
maturity. The spread between yi and the risk-free rate r is often called the credit spread
of the bond. Since the bond price in equation (12) contains the e⁄ects of trading cost and
bankruptcy cost, the credit yield contains a liquidity premium and a default premium. The
focus of our analysis is to uncover the intricate interaction between the liquidity and default
premia.
3.2 Equity Value and Endogenous Bankruptcy Boundary
Leland (1994, 1998) and Leland and Toft (1996) indirectly derive the equity value as the
di⁄erence between the total ￿rm value and the debt value. The total ￿rm value is the
unlevered ￿rm value Vt, plus the total tax-bene￿t, minus the bankruptcy cost. This approach
does not apply to our model because part of the total ￿rm value is consumed by future
trading costs. Thus, we directly compute the equity value E (Vt) through the following
ordinary di⁄erential equation:






t EV V + ￿Vt ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)C +
X
i [di (Vt;mi) ￿ pi]: (15)
14The left-hand side is the required return for the equity holders. This term should be equal to
the expected increment in the equity value, which is the sum of the terms on the right-hand
side.
￿ The ￿rst two terms (r ￿ ￿)VtEV + 1
2￿2V 2
t EV V capture the expected change in the
equity value caused by the ￿ uctuation in the ￿rm￿ s asset value Vt:
￿ The third term ￿Vt is the cash ￿ ow generated by the ￿rm per unit of time.
￿ The fourth term (1 ￿ ￿)C is the after-tax coupon payment per unit of time.
￿ The ￿fth term
X
i [di (Vt;mi) ￿ pi] is the equity holders￿rollover gain/loss from paying
o⁄ the maturing bonds by issuing new bonds at their market values.
Limited liability of equity holders provides the following boundary condition at VB:
E (VB) = 0: (16)
Solving the di⁄erential equation in (15) is challenging because it contains the complicated
bond valuation function di (Vt;mi) given in (12). We manage to solve this equation using the
Laplace transformation technique detailed in Appendix A.2. Based on the equity value, we
then derive the equity holders￿endogenous bankruptcy boundary VB based on the smooth-
pasting condition that
E
0 (VB) = 0:
Chen and Kou (2009) provide a rigorous proof of the optimality of the smooth-pasting
condition in an endogenous-default model under a set of general conditions, which include
￿nite debt maturity and a jump-and-di⁄usion process for the ￿rm￿ s unlevered asset value.
The results are summarized in the next proposition.
Proposition 2 Recall vt = ln(Vt=VB) de￿ned in (11). The equity value E (Vt) is
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4 Market Liquidity and Credit Risk
In this section, we analyze the e⁄ects of deteriorating bond market liquidity on ￿rms￿credit
spreads based on the model derived in the previous section. We ￿rst show that deteriorating
market liquidity can exacerbate the con￿ ict of interest between debt and equity holders and
lead to higher default risk. We then analyze the spillover of liquidity shocks across di⁄erent
debt market segments. Finally, we discuss the ￿ ight-to-quality phenomenon caused by the
varying impact of a market liquidity shock on di⁄erent ￿rms.
To facilitate our discussion, we use a set of baseline parameters:
r = 10%; ￿ = 3%; ￿ = 0:5; ￿ = 35%; ￿ = 7%; V0 = 100; P = 90;
C = 9; m1 = 0:25; m2 = 5; ￿1 = 0:2%; ￿2 = 2%; ￿H = 1; ￿L = 0:8: (19)
We choose the risk-free rate r to be 10%; the cash payout rate ￿ to be 3%; the ￿rm￿ s
liquidation recovery rate ￿ to be 50%, the tax rate ￿ to be 35%; and the asset volatility ￿ to
be 7%: These values are fairly standard, except that ￿ is on the low end relative to the value
used by Leland. We choose a small volatility because we intend to analyze a ￿nancial ￿rm
16which uses high leverage to ￿nance a relatively safe investment position. We let the initial
value of the ￿rm asset to be 100; the total principal value of the ￿rm￿ s debts P to be 90,
and the total annual coupon payment C to be 9: These values imply that the ￿rm￿ s initial
leverage is 73%. We choose the short-term debt maturity m1 to be 3 months (commercial
paper) and the long-term debt maturity m2 to be 5 years (long-term corporate bond). We
set their trading costs ￿1 and ￿2 to be 0:2% and 2%: These values are consistent with the
empirical estimates of Bao, Pan, and Wang (2009). Finally, we let the arrival rate of liquidity
shocks to the type-H and type-L bond holders ￿H and ￿L to be 1 and 0:8; which are broadly
consistent with the average turnover rate of the corporate bonds in the data sample of Bao,
Pan, and Wang (2009). For the analysis in this section with unexpected liquidity shocks, we
treat ￿1 as exogenously given and ￿x it at a value of 42:8%; which is the optimal value we
derive in Section 6. This value is close to the fraction of short-term debt of a typical ￿nancial
￿rm in the Compustat data base.12 Under this set of parameters, the ￿rm￿ s optimal default
boundary VB is 87:1.
4.1 Market Liquidity and Endogenous Defaults
Deteriorating bond market liquidity can exacerbate the con￿ ict of interest between debt
and equity holders when the ￿rm is in ￿nancial distress. As we see in equation (5), when
deteriorating liquidity pushes the market prices of the ￿rm￿ s newly issued bonds below their




(di (Vt;mi;￿H;￿L) ￿ pi);
where we write di as a function of ￿H and ￿L to emphasize the dependence of the rollover
loss on the investors￿demands for bond market liquidity. As a result, when the rollover loss
becomes su¢ ciently large, equity holders will choose to stop servicing the debt even if the
falling bond prices are caused by liquidity reasons.
To illustrate the e⁄ects of a liquidity shock, we conduct the following thought experiment.
Suppose that the arrival rate of liquidity shocks to the type-H bond holders ￿H has an
unexpected increase from its baseline value 1: One can broadly interpret the unexpected
increase in ￿H as a surge in the demand for liquidity by institutions with less secured ￿nancing
(e.g., open-end mutual funds) after a major market disruption, such as the recent failure of
Lehman Brothers or the crisis of LTCM. After the shock, investors will demand a higher
liquidity premium and drive down the bond prices. To analyze the e⁄ects of the shock,
12For ￿nancial ￿rms in the Markit CDS database, the average fraction of short-term debt was 44% right
before the failure of Bear Stearns in March 2009. We thank Haitao Li for providing this number.





























































































































Figure 1: This ￿gure shows the e⁄ects of a change in the arrival rate of liquidity shocks to type-
H investors ￿H on the ￿rm￿ s rollover loss and endogenous bankruptcy boundary, based on the
baseline parameters given in (19), ￿1 = 42:8%. Panel A plots the ￿rm￿ s rollover loss against ￿H
when Vt = 97. Panel B plots the ￿rm￿ s endogenous bankruptcy boundary VB against ￿H. Panels
C and D plot the bond spreads of newly issued short-term and long-term bonds when V0 = 100.
we hold the fraction of the ￿rm￿ s short-term debt at its initial value. For example, bond
covenants and other operational restrictions prevent ￿rms in real life from swiftly modifying
their debt structures in response to sudden market ￿ uctuations. For simplicity, we also treat
the increase in ￿H as permanent in the following discussion.13
Figure 1 illustrates the e⁄ects of a change in ￿H on the equity holders￿rollover loss and
bankruptcy boundary. Panel A plots the rollover loss against ￿H when V = 97. The line
shows that the (absolute value of) rollover loss increases with ￿H. That is, as the arrival rate
of bond holders￿liquidity shocks increases, the increased liquidity premium in bond prices
makes it more costly for the equity holders to roll over the maturing bonds. Consequently,
13In Appendix B, we extend our model to incorporate a temporary liquidity crisis, in which an increase in
￿H mean-reverts back to its normal level according to a Poisson occurrence. This extension becomes more
technically involved and requires substantial numerical analysis. The numerical results nevertheless show
that, even in the case of a liquidity crisis with an expected length of 8 months, rolling over short-term debt
with a maturity of three months makes the 8-month liquidity crisis relatively long, and, as a result, treating
an increase in ￿H as permanent or temporary only leads to modest di⁄erences in the impact on the long-term
and short-term bond spreads.
18Panel B shows that the ￿rm￿ s endogenous bankruptcy boundary VB also increases with ￿H.
In other words, after a liquidity shock, equity holders will choose to default at a higher
fundamental threshold. We formally prove these results in the following proposition. Panels
C and D show that the bond spreads of newly issued short-term and long-term bonds increase
with ￿H:
Proposition 3 All else equal, the bond prices di￿ s decrease with the arrival rate of type-H
bond holders￿liquidity shocks ￿H. Consequently, equity holders￿endogenous default boundary
VB increases with ￿H.
The ￿rm￿ s endogenous bankruptcy decision is rooted in the con￿ ict of interest between
the debt and equity holders. When the ￿rm￿ s bond values fall (even for liquidity reasons as we
illustrated here), the equity holders have to bear all the rollover losses to avoid bankruptcy,
while the maturing debt holders get paid in full. This unequal sharing of losses causes the
equity value to drop down to zero at VB; at which point the equity holders stop servicing the
debt. Could the debt and equity holders share the ￿rm￿ s losses, they would have avoided
the social loss induced by the ￿rm bankruptcy.
The implication of Proposition 3 is consistent with several empirical studies of market-
liquidity e⁄ects on corporate bond spreads, e.g., Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and Martin
(2001), Longsta⁄, Mithal, and Neis (2005), Ericsson and Renault (2006) and Chen, Lesmond,
and Wei (2007). In particular, Chen, Lesmond, and Wei (2007) ￿nd that more illiquid bonds
earn higher yield spreads, and that an improvement in liquidity causes a signi￿cant reduction
in yield spreads. Consistent with their ￿ndings, our model incorporates liquidity premium
as an important factor in bond spreads. Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and Martin (2001)
￿nd that proxies for both changes in the probability of future default based on standard
fundamental-driven credit risk models and for changes in the recovery rate can only explain
about 25% of the observed credit spread changes. On the other hand, they ￿nd that the
residuals from these regressions are highly cross-correlated, and that over 75% of the vari-
ation in the residuals is due to the ￿rst principal component. While they cannot explain
this systematic component, they attribute it to liquidity shocks. Our model explains their
￿ndings by suggesting that shocks to the aggregate demand for bond market liquidity can
act as a common factor in individual bonds￿credit spreads. Furthermore, our model shows
that this liquidity factor a⁄ects not only the liquidity premium, but also future default prob-
abilities. This ampli￿cation mechanism through endogenous ￿rm default helps explain the
large impact of the liquidity factor observed in the data. In the next subsection, we further
illustrate how this mechanism can cause a spillover of liquidity shocks across di⁄erent bond
maturity segments.
194.2 Clientele and Liquidity Spillover E⁄ects
As is well known, bond markets are highly segmented. For example, the market for com-
mercial paper (short-term debt with maturities less than 9 months) operates on di⁄erent
quote conventions than the market for long-term corporate bonds. These markets also have
separate institutional investor clienteles. Greenwood and Vayanos (2008, 2009) provide some
recent evidence on market segmentation in the government bond markets. They interpret
the existence of market segmentation as driven by investors￿preferred habitats, i.e., indi-
vidual investors/institutions have preferred debt maturities due to their di⁄erent investment
objectives. Our model also features separate clienteles for the short-term and long-term
bonds, which are endogenously determined by their heterogeneous bond trading costs and
heterogeneous investor liquidity needs. Type-H investors prefer to hold the more liquid
short-term bonds because of their higher liquidity needs, while the lower liquidity needs of
type-L investors make them the more e¢ cient holders of the less liquid long-term bonds.
Despite the speci￿c clienteles for the long-term and short-term bonds, liquidity shocks to
one market segment can a⁄ect the credit spreads in the other market segment. Such spillovers
occur through several channels. Following our discussion in the previous subsection, after
an unexpected jump in the liquidity demand of type-H investors ￿H, the credit spreads of
short-term bonds (which are held by type-H investors) rise. More interestingly, the increase
in ￿H also drives up the credit spreads of the long-term bonds through three channels, even
though the long-term bonds are held by type-L investors whose liquidity demand remains
at the initial level ￿L.
1. The ￿rst channel works through the equilibrium liquidity premium. Even though the
increase in ￿H does not directly a⁄ect type-L investors, the increase in the liquidity
premium of the short-term bonds also increases the opportunity cost of type-L investors
and thus causes their required return from the long-term bonds r2 to go up, e.g.,
equation (8) of Proposition 1. With a slight abuse of notation, we write the required
return as r2 (￿H):
2. The second channel works through the increase in the ￿rm￿ s endogenous bankruptcy
boundary VB as a result of the increase in the type-H investors￿required return from
the short-term bonds r1 (￿H).
3. The third channel works through the increase in the ￿rm￿ s endogenous bankruptcy
boundary VB as a result of the increase in the type-L investors￿required return from
the long-term bonds r2 (￿H).
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Figure 2: Decomposing the spillover e⁄ects of an increase in ￿H on the credit spread of long-term
bond, based on the baseline parameters given in (19) and by ￿xing the ￿rm￿ s short-term debt
fraction at ￿1 = 42:8% and the current ￿rm fundamental at V0 = 100. Panel A plots the required
returns of both short-term and long-term bonds (r1 and r2) against ￿H. Panel B plots the ￿rm￿ s
endogenous bankruptcy boundary VB against ￿H; with the dotted line representing the baseline
level, the dashed line representing the change in VB in response to rise in r1 only, and the solid line
representing the net change in VB in response to rises in both r1 and r2: Panel C plots the credit
spread of a newly issued long-term bond against ￿H; with the dotted line representing the change
in the credit spread with VB ￿xed at the baseline level, the dashed line representing the change in
the credit spread with VB changing in response to a rise in r1; and the solid line representing the
net change in the credit spread in response to the change in both r1 and r2:
21Figure 2 illustrates these channels. Panel A shows that as ￿H rises, both r1 and r2 (the
required returns from the short-term and long-term bonds) also rise. Panel B shows that as
￿H increases, the ￿rm￿ s endogenous bankruptcy boundary VB also rises and the increase of
VB can be attributed to the increases in both r1 (￿H) and r2 (￿H): Panel C shows that the
credit spread of a newly issued long-term bond also increases with ￿H, and each of the three
channels described above makes a signi￿cant contribution to this increase. In this plot, the
dotted line represents the change in the long-term bond credit spread due to the liquidity
premium, i.e., ￿xing VB at the baseline level; the dashed line represents the change in the
long-term bond credit spread when VB responds only to the change in r1 (￿H); ￿nally, the
solid line represents the total change in the long-term credit spread when VB responds to
the changes in both r1 (￿H) and r2 (￿H):
The e⁄ect of an increase in investor demand for market liquidity on the ￿rm￿ s default
probability, combined with the spillover e⁄ects illustrated in this section, demonstrates the
profound impact of market liquidity on ￿rms￿credit risk. These results also suggest that
time-varying liquidity could contribute a common factor to ￿rms￿default probabilities. A
recent empirical study by Du¢ e et al (2009) indeed ￿nds that the probability of extreme
default losses on portfolios of U.S. corporate debt is much greater than would be estimated
under the standard assumption that default correlation arises from exposure to observable
fundamental factors. Instead, their result points to the presence of common latent factors,
which are a potential re￿ ection of liquidity e⁄ects illustrated by our model.
4.3 Flight to Quality
It is common to observe the so-called ￿ ight-to-quality phenomenon after major liquidity
disruptions in ￿nancial markets￿ prices (credit spreads) of low quality bonds drop (rise)
much more than those of high quality bonds. Recent episodes include the stock market
crash of 1987, the events surrounding the Russian default and the crisis of LTCM in 1998,
the events after the attacks of 9/11 in 2001, and the credit crisis of 2007/2008. The BIS
(1999) report documents that during the 1998 LTCM crisis, which is widely regarded as a
market-wide liquidity shock, the yields of speculative-grade corporate bonds and emerging
market bonds rose much more than those of investment-grade bonds. A recent BIS report by
Fender, Ho, and Hordahl (2009) shows that in a two-month period around the bankruptcy
of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, the US ￿ve-year CDX high yield index spread shot
up from around 700 basis points to over 1500, while the corresponding investment grade
index spread widened from 150 basis points to a little above 250. Acharya, Amihud, and
Bharath (2009) provide systematic evidence that the exposures (or betas) of speculative-




















































































Figure 3: This ￿gure plots the credit spreads of the newly issued short-term and long-term bonds of
two ￿rms with di⁄erent fundamentals against the arrival rate of type-H investors￿liquidity shocks
￿H, based on the baseline parameters given in (19) and by ￿xing the ￿rms￿short-term debt fraction
at ￿1 = 42:8%. One of the ￿rms has a fundamental of V = 100; while the other ￿rm has V = 97:
grade corporate bonds to market liquidity shocks rise substantially during times of high
macroeconomic stress, illiquidity and volatility.
Can our model explain the ￿ ight-to-quality phenomenon? To address this question,
we examine two ￿rms that are identical, except that one ￿rm has a higher fundamental
(V = 100) than the other (V = 97): We compare the changes in the credit spreads of these
two ￿rms￿newly issued short-term and long-term bonds as the intensity of the type-H bond
holders￿liquidity shocks ￿H jumps from 1 to 2. Figure 3 shows that the credit spreads of
the weaker ￿rm are more sensitive to the increase in ￿H than those of the stronger ￿rm.
The intuition is simple. The increase in the bond holders￿liquidity needs pushes up the
￿rms￿endogenous bankruptcy boundary. Since the weaker ￿rm is closer to the bankruptcy
boundary to begin with, the same increase of endogenous bankruptcy boundary has a greater
e⁄ect on the weaker ￿rm. As a result, its credit spreads shoot up more than those of the
stronger ￿rm.
Our explanation of the ￿ ight-to-quality phenomenon is di⁄erent from the existing ones.
The BIS report (1999) attributes ￿ ight-to-quality to suddenly increased risk aversion of
market participants. Vayanos (2004) provides an explanation based on professional fund
managers￿career concerns, He and Krishnamurthy (2008) develop a model to show that
falling intermediary capital can cause households to ￿ y from risky assets to risk-free bonds,
and Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2008) argue for Knightian uncertainty. These expla-
23nations are all based on considerations from the investor side. Our model focuses on the
￿nancing issues from the ￿rm side and shows that deterioration of market liquidity increases
rollover risk and makes the weaker ￿rms more likely to eventually fail.
Corroborating our theory, Fender, Ho, and Hordahl (2009) show that soon after the
market liquidity breakdown caused by the failure of Lehman Brothers in September 2008,
the default rates of speculative-grade bonds increased signi￿cantly from the very low levels
(around 1%) observed in early 2008 to nearly 5% in March 2009, and were expected to
rise further. The recent bankruptcy of General Growth Properties in April 2009, one of
the largest mall operators in the US, nicely illustrates how the deteriorating credit market
liquidity put pressure on lower-quality ￿rms:
￿Despite bargaining for months with its creditors, General Growth faced dwindling
options for handling its more than $25 billion in debt, largely in the form of short-
term mortgages that will come due by next year. The company has been severely
wounded by the trouble in the ￿nancial markets, which has wreaked havoc on its
ability to re￿nance that debt.￿ The New York Times (April 16, 2009)
5 Ampli￿cation by Short-term Debt
The ongoing ￿nancial crisis reveals that many ￿nancial ￿rms rely heavily on short-term
debt such as commercial paper and overnight repos to ￿nance their investment positions.
Commercial paper typically has a maturity of less than 270 days, while overnight repos have
an extremely short maturity of one day. What is the e⁄ect of short-term debt on the ￿rm￿ s
exposure to the liquidity shocks?
To examine this question, we compare two otherwise identical ￿rms, one with a short-
term debt fraction ￿1 of 42:8% and the other with 30%: Figure 4 plots both ￿rms￿rollover loss
and endogenous bankruptcy boundary against the arrival rate of the type-H bond holders￿
liquidity shocks ￿H: Panel A shows that the rollover loss of the ￿rm with higher ￿1 rises
much faster with the increase in ￿H: This is because short-term debt needs to be rolled
over at a higher frequency. As a result, when bond prices drop below their principal values,
equity holders have to pay o⁄the losses incurred from the debt at a faster speed. The heavier
￿nancial burden increases the risk that equity value will fall to zero and causes equity holders
to quit servicing the debt at a higher fundamental threshold. Indeed, Panel B shows that the
￿rm with the higher short-term debt fraction has a higher bankruptcy boundary VB. Taken
together, this ￿gure illustrates that short-term debt can further exacerbate the con￿ ict of
interest between the debt and equity holders in ￿nancial distresses, and thus increase the


























































Figure 4: This ￿gure plots the rollover loss and bankruptcy boundary against the arrival rate of
type-H investors￿liquidity shocks ￿H for two otherwise identical ￿rms, except one has a short-term
debt fraction ￿1 of 42:8% and the other 30%: This ￿gure is based on the baseline parameters given
in (19). The rollover loss is measured when the ￿rm fundamental is at V = 97.
￿rm￿ s default risk.
To further illustrate the intuition, we introduce di to normalize the market value of the





corresponds to the value of a class-i bond with a coupon rate C and a principal P (recall
equations (3) and (4)). These two normalized bonds di⁄er only in their maturities, which
allows us to rewrite the ￿rm￿ s net rollover gain/loss in (t;t+dt) as (ignoring the net coupon









For each class of debt, the rollover loss is proportional to the normalized loss di (Vt;mi)￿P
and the rollover frequency 1
mi.
To understand the role of maturity in rollover losses in equation (21), let us ￿rst discuss
the normalized loss di (Vt;mi)￿P. Note that short-term debt is more liquid than long-term
debt (￿1 < ￿2). As a result, if default is not a concern, i.e., the ￿rm￿ s fundamental is strong,
then we have d1 > d2. In words, short-term debt has a smaller rollover loss for each unit
of normalized bond. This then makes the dramatic e⁄ect of short-term debt on the ￿rm￿ s
bankruptcy boundary more surprising.
The key to this e⁄ect lies in the rollover frequency 1
m, i.e., a shorter maturity mi means
a higher rollover frequency, which ampli￿es the rollover loss. This e⁄ect lies at the heart


























Figure 5: This ￿gure plots the ￿rm￿ s rollover loss at di⁄erent ￿rm fundamentals for each unit of
short-term and short-term debt (with same face value P = 90 and coupon C = 9). This ￿gure is
based on the parameters given in (19) and ￿1 = 42:8%:
of how short-term debt causes the mounting ￿nancial burden on the ￿rm exactly when its
fundamental is weak. For illustration, Figure 5 plots the ￿rm￿ s loss from rolling over its
short-term and long-term debt with respect to the ￿rm fundamental. The ￿gure shows that
when the ￿rm￿ s fundamental is strong, short-term debt does provide a smaller rollover loss
than long-term debt.14 However, when the ￿rm￿ s fundamental is weak and thus close to
bankruptcy, short-term debt generates a much larger rollover loss than long-term debt. In
other words, the rollover gain/loss from short-term debt is highly skewed on the downside,
while that from long-term debt is relatively ￿ at.
From a contracting point of view, these di⁄erent rollover gain/loss pro￿les are due to
the fact that short-term debt is a ￿harder￿claim relative to long-term debt. Essentially,
short-term bond holders do not share gains/losses with equity holders to the same extent as
long-term debt holders do, and, as a result, short-term debt leads to greater rollover losses
borne by equity holders in bad times than long-term debt. This is similar in spirit to the
debt-overhang problem initially suggested by Myers (1977). See Diamond and He (2010)
for a recent study, which further analyzes the e⁄ects of short-term debt overhang on ￿rms￿
default/investment decisions during bad times.
This problem has a direct impact on the value of the equity holders￿embedded real
option of keeping the ￿rm alive. Even if the current fundamental is weak, equity holders
14Because of the low coupon rate speci￿ed in this illustration (i.e., the bonds are not issued at par by
setting C = P=r), the ￿rm always has a rollover loss, which serves in this situation as part of the interest
payment for its debt. This amounts to a level shift in rollover losses in Figure 5 and will not a⁄ect the
relative comparison between long-term and short-term debt.
26could choose to absorb the rollover losses out of hope for a future fundamental comeback.
The negatively skewed payo⁄ from rolling over short-term debt, which is designed to avoid
sharing the losses with equity holders, makes keeping the ￿rm alive costly and the option
less valuable. In contrast, the ￿ at payo⁄ from rolling over long-term debt makes the option
more valuable as long-term debt holders are sharing some of the losses with equity holders
in bad times.
We can formally prove a set of results related to the discussion above. First, we can show
that between two ￿rms, one purely ￿nanced by short-term debt and the other purely ￿nanced
by long-term debt, the short-term ￿nanced ￿rm has a higher default boundary under some
su¢ cient conditions.
Proposition 4 Suppose that ￿i￿j = 0 for i 2 fH;Lg and j 2 f1;2g, and P = C
r . Then,
VB (1) > VB (0), i.e., the endogenous bankruptcy boundary of a 100% short-term ￿nanced
￿rm is higher than that of a 100% long-term ￿nanced ￿rm.
Proposition 4 imposes two su¢ cient conditions. First, the bonds￿liquidity premia are
zero either because the investors￿liquidity needs are zero or the bonds￿trading costs are
zero. Second, the bond￿ s principal value is identical to the discounted value of the perpetual
stream of its coupons, i.e., the ￿rm faces no rollover loss when there is no default risk. These
conditions are somewhat strong, as the complex expression of VB in equation (18) prevents
us from deriving the result of Proposition 4 under more relaxed conditions. However, by
continuity arguments, the result must hold when the model parameters are close to the
speci￿ed conditions (i.e., either ￿i￿ s or ￿i￿ s are small and the principal P is close to C=r).
Furthermore, our numerical exercises also show that the result holds for a wide range of
parameter values.
We can further prove that if the result of Proposition 4 holds, the ￿rm￿ s bankruptcy
boundary is monotonically increasing in the fraction of its short-term debt.
Proposition 5 Suppose that VB (1) > VB (0), i.e., the endogenous bankruptcy boundary of
a 100% short-term ￿nanced ￿rm is higher than that of a 100% long-term ￿nanced ￿rm.
Then, VB (￿1) is monotonically increasing with ￿1, i.e., the greater the fraction of the ￿rm￿ s
short-term debt, the higher its endogenous bankruptcy boundary.
This proposition provides a key factor in our analysis of the ￿rm￿ s optimal debt maturity
structure in Section 6.
In assigning credit ratings, rating agencies tend to ignore the e⁄ects of ￿rms￿debt matu-
rity structures. Gopalan, Song, and Yerramilli (2009) ￿nd that ￿rms with a higher proportion












































































Figure 6: This ￿gure shows the e⁄ect of shortening the maturity of the short-term debt, based on
the model parameters given in (19) and ￿xing the short-term debt fraction ￿1 at 5%: Panel A plots
the ￿rm￿ s bankruptcy boundary VB against the short-term debt rollover frequency ￿1; and Panel
B plots the credit spread of newly issued long-term bond against ￿1:
of short-term debt are more likely to experience multi-notch credit-rating downgrades. Their
evidence suggests that credit ratings underestimate the so-called ￿maturity risk￿ , an e⁄ect
demonstrated by Proposition 5. Interestingly, rating agencies have recently started to incor-
porate this risk into credit ratings. For example, one of the major rating agencies, Standard
& Poor￿ s, has recently improved its approach to rating speculative-grade credits by adjusting
for maturity risk:
￿Although we believe that our enhanced analytics will not have a material e⁄ect
on the majority of our current ratings, individual ratings may be revised. For
example, a company with heavy debt maturities over the near term (especially
considering the current market conditions) would face more credit risk, notwith-
standing benign long-term prospects.￿Ratings Direct (2008, page 6).
Repo Financing In the months leading up to its bankruptcy, Lehman Brothers was rolling
over 25% of its debt every day through overnight repos. Repos are a type of collateralized
lending agreement, in which a borrower ￿nances the purchase of a ￿nancial security using
the security as collateral. Overnight repos have an extremely short maturity of one day.
What is the e⁄ect of overnight repos on the bankruptcy risk of a ￿rm? To illustrate the
impact of repo ￿nancing, we consider a hypothetical ￿rm with the baseline parameters given
in (19). We reduce the maturity of the short-term debt m1 from 3 months to 1 day (overnight
28repos). We denote by ￿1 = 1
m1 the rollover frequency of the short-term debt, which is 4 for
commercial paper with a 3-month maturity and 250 for overnight repos. We also ￿x the
short-term debt fraction at 5% to focus on the e⁄ect of shortening the maturity.15 Figure
6 shows that shortening maturity to 1 day has a large impact on default probability even
with a small fraction of debt is short-term. Panel A shows that as the rollover frequency
increases from 4 to 250; the endogenous bankruptcy boundary VB increases from slightly
above 74 to 95. As a result of the substantial increase in VB; the credit spread of newly
issued long-term bonds rises from 160 basis points to 405. This ￿gure shows that simply
shortening the maturity of a small fraction of the ￿rm￿ s debt from 3 months to 1 day can
have a dramatic impact on the ￿rm￿ s ￿nancial stability.
Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009), Geanakoplos (2009), and Shleifer and Vishny (2009)
emphasize the destabilizing e⁄ect of the ￿haircut￿(or margin) of the repos, i.e., creditors will
increase the haircut when market liquidity deteriorates or when price volatility spikes. The
increased margin requirement forces equity-constrained borrowers to liquidate their positions
at ￿resale prices, resulting in a margin spiral. In sharp contrast, our model shows that even
in the absence of any equity constraint on borrowers, the high rollover frequency of overnight
repos can still lead to a debt crisis. Essentially, the repo rollover acts as a mark-to-market
mechanism, forcing borrowers to absorb the losses accumulated in their positions every day
through margin calls. The heavy ￿nancial burden on the borrowers can in turn motivate
them to default at a higher fundamental threshold.16
Our focus on the rollover risk of short-term debt complements a recent study by Acharya,
Gale, and Yorulmazer (2009). They study a setting in which asset owners have no capital and
need to use the purchased risky asset as collateral to secure short-term debt funding. They
show that the high rollover frequency associated with short-term debt can lead to diminishing
debt capacity. Di⁄erent from their model, our model demonstrates the severe consequences
of short-term debt even in the absence of any constraint on equity issuance. This feature
also di⁄erentiates our model from other papers related to rollover risk, e.g., Morris and Shin
(2004, 2009) and He and Xiong (2009), which all assume implicit constraints on raising more
equity when ￿rms are in distress.
15We reduce the short-term debt fraction from 42:8% in the previous illustrations to 5% here because a
higher fraction, when combined with the high rollover frequency of overnight repos, would have caused the
￿rm￿ s bankruptcy boundary to be higher than the initial ￿rm fundamental V0 = 100:
16Since bankruptcy leads to a social loss, it is tempting to argue that debt restructuring, such as swapping
debt into equity or lengthening the debt maturities, would be Pareto improving. However, such modi￿cations
of the debt agreements are already de￿ned as a credit event, which would trigger many credit default swap
contracts to pay out. As a result, even if such debt modi￿cations avoid the social loss, they would hurt some
parties and thus run into resistance in practice.
























































Figure 7: This ￿gure plots the ￿rm￿ s endogenous bankruptcy boundary VB and the total ￿rm value
against the ￿rm￿ s short-term debt fraction ￿1, based on the baseline parameters given in (19).
6 Optimal Debt Maturity Structure
In our model, there are two opposing forces working together to determine the ￿rm￿ s ex ante
optimal debt maturity structure. On one hand, short-term debt is more liquid and therefore
is cheaper for the ￿rm.17 On the other, short-term debt exacerbates the con￿ ict of interest
between debt and equity holders and therefore increases the ￿rm￿ s future default probability.
In this section, we examine this tradeo⁄ between short-term debt￿ s cheaper ￿nancing cost
and higher expected bankruptcy cost in determining the ￿rm￿ s optimal maturity structure.
Consider the ￿rm￿ s optimal maturity structure choice at time 0: The ￿rm￿ s objective is
to maximize the total ￿rm value, the sum of equity, short-term and long-term bonds:
max
￿12[0;1]
E (V ) + D1 (V ) + D2 (V ):
This objective is also consistent with that of the equity holders at time 0 before the bonds
are issued. Since the objective is a continuous function of ￿1 and ￿1 takes values in a closed
set [0;1]; there must exist an optimum.
Figure 7 plots the ￿rm￿ s endogenous bankruptcy boundary VB and the total ￿rm value
against the ￿rm￿ s short-term debt fraction ￿1. Panel A shows that VB increases with ￿1;
consistent with our discussion before. Panel B shows that the total ￿rm value is maximized
when ￿
￿
1 = 42:8%: This interior optimum re￿ ects the tradeo⁄ between the short-term debt￿ s
cheaper ￿nancing cost and higher expected bankruptcy cost.
17The lower cost of short-term debt ￿nancing could also arise from other sources, such as an upward-sloping
yield curve and investor preference for short-term debt, e.g., Greenwood, Hanson, and Stein (2009).















































































Figure 8: This ￿gure shows how ￿rm characteristics a⁄ect the ￿rm￿ s optimal short-term debt
fraction ￿￿
1, based on the baseline parameters given in (19). Panel A plots ￿￿
1 against the ￿rm￿ s
asset volatility ￿. Panel B plots ￿￿
1 against the bankruptcy recovery rate ￿. Panel C plots ￿￿
1 against
the long-term debt trading cost ￿2. Finally, Panel D plots ￿￿
1 against the common component ￿
in the trading cost ￿1 and ￿2 of the ￿rm￿ s short-term and long-term bonds.
Figure 8 illustrates how ￿rm characteristics a⁄ect its optimal short-term debt fraction
￿
￿
1, based on the baseline parameters given in (19). Panel A shows that ￿
￿
1 decreases with
the ￿rm￿ s asset volatility ￿: As the volatility increases, it raises the ￿rm￿ s future default
probability and therefore its expected bankruptcy cost. As a result, it is desirable for the ￿rm
to use less short-term debt to reduce the bankruptcy cost. The ￿gure also shows that, in the
region where the asset volatility is low (lower than 5:2%), the cheaper-cost e⁄ect dominates
and induces the ￿rm to use 100% short-term debt. Panel B shows that ￿
￿
1 increases with the
￿rm￿ s bankruptcy recovery rate ￿: As ￿ increases, the expected bankruptcy cost becomes
smaller. As a result, the ￿rm can take advantage of the cheaper ￿nancing cost of short-term
debt more aggressively.
Panel C shows that there is a non-monotonic relationship between ￿
￿
1 and the long-term
debt trading cost ￿2: ￿
￿
1 ￿rst increases with ￿2 when it is relatively low and decreases with
31￿2 when it becomes high. This plot again re￿ ects the tradeo⁄ between the ￿nancing cost
and expected bankruptcy cost. As ￿2 increases, the direct e⁄ect is that the long-term debt
becomes more expensive. This e⁄ect makes the short-term debt more attractive, and thus
explains the increasing part of the plot. When ￿2 increases, an indirect e⁄ect is that it
induces the ￿rm to set a higher bankruptcy threshold, resulting in a higher future default
probability. This indirect e⁄ect makes the short-term debt less attractive on the margin,
and explains the decreasing part of the plot.
If the trading costs of the short-term and long-term debt, ￿1 and ￿2; increase together,
then the substitution e⁄ect between the two types of debt is void and only the second
(indirect) e⁄ect through the ￿rm￿ s endogenous default is in operation. Panel D of Figure
8 shows that as the common component in ￿1 and ￿2 increases, the optimal short-term
debt fraction ￿
￿
1 decreases. This is because the increased market illiquidity makes the ￿rm
more likely to default in the future. As a result, the bankruptcy-cost e⁄ect becomes more
important.
The existing theories of ￿rms￿debt maturity choice have mostly focused on the disci-
plinary role of short-term debt in preventing managers￿asset substitution, e.g., Flannery
(1994) and Leland (1998), and private information of borrowers about their future credit
ratings, e.g., Flannery (1986) and Diamond (1991). These theories have had some suc-
cess in explaining the data, as shown by Barclay and Smith (1995) and Guedes and Opler
(1996). Our model provides a new hypothesis, which relates ￿rms￿debt maturity structure
to market-liquidity considerations.
Maturity Structure as Liquidity Management In fact, our analysis shows that debt
maturity structure should be used as part of a ￿rm￿ s liquidity management strategy. As
discussed in Section 5, despite its higher cost, long-term debt gives the ￿rm more ￿ exibility
to delay realizing ￿nancial losses in adverse states, either when the ￿rm￿ s fundamental or
bond market liquidity deteriorates. This bene￿t is analogous to the role of cash reserves, the
standard tool for risk management, e.g., Holmstrom and Tirole (2001) and Bolton, Chen,
and Wang (2009). Keeping cash is costly for a ￿rm, but it allows the ￿rm to avoid future
￿nancial constraints and to take advantage of future investment opportunities.
Brunnermeier and Yogo (2009) argue that ￿rms should shift to long-term debt as their
fundamentals deteriorate. This argument is consistent with the basic result of our model that
the bankruptcy cost (or the loss of ￿ exibility) from using short-term debt becomes higher
as the ￿rm￿ s fundamental or bond market liquidity deteriorates. This e⁄ect motivates the
￿rm to use less short-term debt in these states. This argument is appealing, but it is also
32countered by other con￿ icts between debt and equity holders. As pointed out by Leland
(1994), adjusting debt policy in his model by retiring or issuing debt ex post is infeasible
to the extent that it will hurt either equity or long-term debt holders. This argument also
applies to our setting in adjusting the debt maturity structure ex post.18 A systematic
analysis of these arguments is important, but is a challenge beyond our current framework.
We leave it for future research.
7 Conclusion
This paper provides a model to analyze e⁄ects of a ￿rm￿ s rollover risk on its credit risk,
through the con￿ ict of interest between debt and equity holders. When the ￿rm faces losses
in rolling over its maturing debt, its equity holders are willing to absorb the losses only if
the option value of keeping the ￿rm alive justi￿es the cost of paying o⁄ the maturing debt
holders. As liquidity shocks push down bond prices, they amplify the con￿ ict of interest
between the debt and equity holders because, to avoid bankruptcy, the equity holders have
to absorb all of the losses from rolling over maturing bonds at the reduced market prices.
As a result, equity holders choose to default at a higher fundamental threshold even if ￿rms
can freely raise more equity. A greater fraction of short-term debt further exacerbates the
debt crisis by forcing the equity holders to realize the rollover loss at a higher frequency.
Our model thus provides a new perspective to understand the ￿nancial instability created
by overnight repos, an extreme form of short-term ￿nancing, to many ￿nancial ￿rms.
Our model also features separate clienteles for long-term and short-term bonds, endoge-
nously determined by heterogeneous liquidity needs and heterogeneous bond trading costs.
We highlight di⁄erent channels through which liquidity shocks to one market segment a⁄ect
the credit spreads in the other segment, and provide a new explanation for the widely ob-
18Regarding issuing more debt, see the related discussion in footnote 7. It is clear that increasing ￿1 leads
to a higher bankruptcy boundary VB, and therefore hurts long-term debt holders. Now suppose that the
￿rm adjusts ￿1 downward. One possible policy is to issue more long-term debt to replace the maturing
short-term debt, until a certain desirable maturity structure is achieved. In the interim period, the replaced
short-term debt has coupon (principal) ￿1
m1C ( ￿1
m1P). Therefore, to maintain the ￿rm￿ s net coupon and debt
principal, the ￿rm needs to issue ￿1
m1
m2
￿2 units of long-term debt. The net ￿nancing e⁄ect, relative to the











d2 (Vt;m2) / ￿d1 (Vt;m1) + d2 (Vt;m2):
Since the short-term debt is safer than the long-term debt, typically d1 > d2 and the above term is negative.
This heuristic argument implies that the ￿nancial burden on the equity holders actually increases during
the adjustment process, and therefore it is not in the interest of the equity holders to reduce the short-term
debt fraction. For a related analysis of equity holders￿ex post incentive to reduce leverage in response to
poor ￿rm performance, see Dangl and Zechner (2007).
33served ￿ ight-to-quality phenomenon. We also examine a tradeo⁄ between short-term debt￿ s
cheaper ￿nancing cost and higher future bankruptcy cost in determining ￿rms￿optimal debt
maturity structure and liquidity management strategy.
Appendix A Proofs for Propositions
A.1 Proof for Proposition 1
Because of the large number of type-H investors in the market, competition implies that
each type-H investor earns only an expected return of r on his capital. It is natural to
hypothesize that type-H investors are the marginal investors in the more liquid short-term















@V 2 + c1 ￿ ￿H￿1d1;















@V 2 + c1; (22)
where
r1 = r + ￿H￿1
is the expected return of the bond. The expected return is higher than r because of the
additional liquidity premium ￿H￿1:
We now derive the required return for type-L investors, who are the marginal investors
in the less liquid long-term bonds. We ￿rst solve for the type-L investors￿value function,
and then verify that they have no strict incentive to switch from investing in the less liquid
long-term bonds to investing in the more liquid short-term bonds. Finally, we verify that
type-H investors have no incentive to switch from investing in the more liquid short-term
bonds to investing in the less liquid long-term bonds.
Because of the limited number of type-L investors, they earn an extra rent on their capital
in addition to the riskfree rate r. We denote the value function of a type-L investor as u(w),
which is a function of his capital w: We conjecture that u(￿) has a linear form (and verify
shortly):
u(w) = Qw;
where the constant Q (to be determined shortly) measures the marginal utility of each unit
of capital for type-L investors. It is intuitive that Q is related to the return o⁄ered by the
long-term bond. More speci￿cally, the HJB equation for a type-L investor from investing in



















@V 2 + c2
￿
+ ￿L [(1 ￿ ￿2)w ￿ Qw]:
34Here, the left-hand-side represents the type-L investor￿ s required return. On the right-hand-
side, the ￿rst term represents the expected bond return, and the second term represents the















@V 2 + c2;
where







is the expected return from holding the long-term bond.
Note that type-L investors can also invest in the short-term bond. Thus, the expected




















@V 2 + c1
￿
+ ￿L [(1 ￿ ￿1)w ￿ Qw];






















@V 2 + c1:
This equation guarantees that type-L investors are indi⁄erent between holding less liquid
















This result also implies that the parameter restriction ￿L > ￿H￿1 ensures that Q is well-
de￿ned; in fact, if ￿L < ￿H￿1 then type-L investors￿value is unbounded. Combining this
result with equation (23), we have




Next, we consider the incentive of a type-H investor to hold a long-term bond. The


















@V 2 + c2 ￿ ￿H￿2d2
￿
;
which, by using equation (23), is
r2 ￿ ￿H￿2 = r ￿ (￿2 ￿ ￿1)(￿H ￿ ￿L) < r:
Thus, the type-H investor strictly prefers a short-term bond to a long-term bond.
35A.2 Proof for Proposition 2
We omit the time subscript in Vt and vt in the following derivation. The equity value satis￿es
the following ODE:





2EV V + d1 (V;m1) + d2 (V;m2) + ￿V ￿
￿






































with the boundary conditions
E (0) = 0 and Ev (0) = l;
where the free parameter l is to be determined by the boundary condition when v ! 1
(where the equity value is linear in V ).
De￿ne the Laplace transformation of E (v) as





Then, applying the Laplace transformation to both sides of the ODE (24), we have:
rF (s) =
￿























L[Ev] = sF (s) ￿ E (0) = sF (s)
and
L[Evv] = s
2F (s) ￿ sE (0) ￿ Ev (0) = s


































De￿ne ￿ and ￿ to be the solutions to following quadratic equation, i.e.,
r ￿
￿















2 (s ￿ ￿)(s + ￿);







(s ￿ ￿)(s + ￿)
￿





























































where F (mi) and Gi (mi) are given in equation (13), i.e.,


























































(1 ￿ ￿)C +
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Call the ￿rst line in (26) b F (s), and it is easy to work out its Laplace inverse as






























































































37Call the second line in (26)
P
i F (s). One can show that

































































































































k2 ￿ a + zi
￿
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￿ ￿ a ￿ zi
￿
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Mi (v;x;w;x + w;q) = ￿Ki (x;w;q);Mi (v;x;w;p;x + w) = Ki (x;w;p):






































































￿Ki (v;a;￿a;￿￿) + 1
￿Ki (v;a;￿a;￿)
+1














z￿ziKi (v;a;￿zi;￿￿) ￿ 1
z+ziKi (v;a;￿zi;￿)
￿ 1







There is one free parameter l = E0 (0) to be pinned down by the boundary condition at





and ￿ > 1,
to avoid explosion we need the coe¢ cient of e￿v in E(v) to collapse to 0. Collecting coe¢ cients
of e￿v, we require that (note that ￿￿ ￿ a = ￿z, ￿ = 2a + ￿, 1
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: (28)
This condition gives l as an expression of primitive parameters and the bankruptcy boundary
VB. More importantly, this implies that the constant coe¢ cient of e￿v should be zero. This
simpli￿es the expression of Ki that involves ￿￿ to



















The smooth pasting condition implies that E0 (VB) = 0, or E0
v (0) = l = 0. Then we can
use condition (28) to obtain VB. With these results, we have the closed-form expressions for
E(v) and VB stated in Proposition 2.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 3
We ￿rst ￿x the default boundary VB. According to the Feynman-Kac formula, PDE (6)





￿ri￿(￿^￿B)di (￿ ^ ￿B)
￿
; (29)
39where ￿B = inf ft : Vt = VBg is the ￿rst hitting time of Vt to VB. Vt follows (1), and
di (￿ ^ ￿B) is de￿ned by the boundary conditions in (9) and (10):
di (￿ ^ ￿B) =
￿ 1
mi￿i￿VB if ￿ ^ ￿B = ￿B
pi if ￿ ^ ￿B = ￿
:
Proposition 1 shows that both r1 and r2 increase with ￿H: Because in equation (29) ￿H
enters di in the discount rate ri, and an increase in ￿H raises the discount rate, a path-by-
path argument implies that di decreases with ￿H.





￿Vs ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)C +
P2





where we write the dependence of di on ￿H explicitly. Again, a path-by-path argument
implies that once ￿xing VB, E decreases with ￿H.
We now consider two di⁄erent values of ￿H: ￿1 < ￿2. Denote the corresponding default
boundaries as VB;1 and VB;2. We need to show that VB;1 < VB;2. Suppose that the opposite
is true, i.e., VB;1 ￿ VB;2. Since the equity value is zero on the default boundary, we have
E (VB;1;VB;1;￿1) = E (VB;2;VB;2;￿2) = 0;
where we expand the notation to let the equity value E(Vt;VB;￿H) explicitly depend on VB
(the default boundary) and ￿H (the liquidity shock arrival of type-H investors). Also, the
optimality of the default boundary implies that
0 = E (VB;1;VB;1;￿1) > E (VB;1;VB;2;￿1):
Since E decreases with ￿H, E (VB;1;VB;2;￿1) > E (VB;1;VB;2;￿2). Because VB;1 ￿ VB;2 ac-
cording to our counter-factual hypothesis, E (VB;1;VB;2;￿2) < 0. This contradicts to limited
liability which says that
E (Vt;VB;2;￿2) ￿ 0 for all Vt ￿ VB;2:
Therefore VB;1 < VB;2.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 4
When the ￿rm is only ￿nanced by one class of debt, and ￿i￿j = 0 for i 2 fH;Lg and
j 2 f1;2g, this setting is identical to Leland and Toft (1996). The endogenous default













1 + (1 ￿ ￿)￿ + ￿ b B
;
40where
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@m has the same sign as @ b B
















Therefore, VB (m1) > VB (m2).















































































mi￿i￿[Bi (￿zi) + Bi (zi)]
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is decreasing in ￿1, w(￿1) is increasing in ￿1. Our claim follows.
41Appendix B Modeling a Temporary Liquidity Crisis
In this appendix, we model a temporary liquidity crisis. Suppose that at t = 0 the intensity
￿H of Poisson liquidity shocks to type-H investors unexpectedly jumps to a higher level
￿
cr
H (where the superscript cr stands for crisis). One can interpret this event as a crisis
that dramatically increases the rate of investor redemption faced by ￿nancial institutions.
At a future time ￿￿ the liquidity-shock intensity ￿
cr
H reverts back to its normal level ￿H
permanently. Suppose that ￿￿ follows an exponential distribution with parameter ￿ (i.e.,
the crisis ends at a Poisson event with intensity of ￿). For simplicity we assume that the
liquidity-shock intensity of type-L investors does not rise in the crisis.
The breakout of the crisis causes investors￿required returns from the short-term and
long-term bonds to change. Following Proposition 1, we specify the required return for the
short-term bonds to be
r
cr
1 = r + ￿
cr
H￿1
and the required return for the long-term bonds to be
r
cr




























@V 2 + ci + ￿(d
cr
i ￿ di):
Denote by V cr
B the endogenous bankruptcy boundary in crisis, which is determined later.
Because in the crisis the required bond returns rise, equity holders incur more rollover losses
relative to normal times. This suggests that V cr
B > VB, i.e., equity holders default at a higher
fundamental boundary in crisis. Moreover, it implies that when ￿
cr
H reverts back to ￿H, i.e.,
when the economy returns to normalcy, the ￿rm is strictly above the normal-period default
boundary and we can evaluate the debt and equity values based on the results that we have
derived in Section 3.
B.1 Bond Value
We need to calculate the value of a class-i bond dcr
i (V0 = V;￿) in the crisis period, where ￿
is the time-to-maturity. There are two cases to consider:
1. If ￿￿ < ￿, i.e., the crisis ends before the bond matures. At ￿￿; investors who hold
class-i bonds get di (V￿￿;￿ ￿ ￿￿) which is the bond value in the normal period. Then
d
cr

































42where F cr (s;V ;V cr
B ) is the cumulative distribution function of the ￿rst hitting time for
V at V cr
B , and fcr (s;V ;V cr
B ) is its density. The ￿rst term is the value of expected coupon
payments until ￿￿, the second term is the expected value at ￿￿ without bankruptcy,
and the third term is the value of expected bankruptcy recovery. By simplifying the






























































































































To calculate the second term EV0=V
￿




Vs > V cr
B
￿
, note that (e.g.,




































































































￿ ￿ ￿ ￿V￿￿ 2 dy
￿
;
43where di (V￿￿;￿ ￿ ￿￿;VB) is the normal-period bond value with time-to-maturity ￿￿￿￿
given in (12):



















Gi (￿ ￿ ￿￿):
(32)
2. If ￿￿ > ￿, the bond matures before the crisis ends, and we have
d
cr





i sci (1 ￿ F
cr (s;V ;V
cr
B ))ds + e
￿rcr



















































































where for ￿￿ < ￿ we have
d
cr




























Piece by piece, we can show that
d
cr
i (V;￿) = Qi (Vt;￿;VB)e
￿￿￿ +















i ￿ ￿ G
cr


































i ￿ ￿ + rcr
i and Gi (￿;￿) is Gi (￿) in (30) but with zcr






























￿ ￿ ￿ ￿V￿￿ 2 dy
￿
d￿￿:
Note that we have derived closed-form expressions for the integrands in (31) and (32). We use




To calculate the crisis-period equity value Ecr, we have
rE













i (V;mi) ￿ pi] + ￿(E ￿ E
cr):





B ) = 0 and E
cr0 (V
cr
B ) = 0:
At V = 1, there is no default, and one can show that
E

























































i mi ￿ 1
￿
:
We use the standard shooting method (Matlab function ode15s) to compute Ecr and V cr
B .
B.3 Numerical Results
We present some numerical results in Table B.1 to compare the di⁄erence between treating
a liquidity crisis as permanent or temporary. The baseline case is ￿
cr
H = ￿H = 1 (normal
period), where we calculate the bankruptcy boundary, short-term bond spread and long-term
bond spread. For the temporary-crisis case, we set ￿ = 1:5 so that the crisis will last on
average for 8 months before ￿
cr
H reverts back to its normal level ￿H. For ￿
cr
H > ￿H = 1; we are
particularly interested in the di⁄erence between the temporary-crisis case (￿ = 1:5) and the
permanent-crisis case (￿ = 0). We present the results for ￿
cr
H = 2 and 3. As expected, there
are some quantitative di⁄erences in the bonds spreads between these two cases￿ the bond
spreads of both long-term (LT) and short-term (ST) bonds rise less in the temporary-crisis
case than in the permanent-crisis case. But the di⁄erences are nevertheless modest relative
to the increases in these bond spreads from their baseline levels.
Table B.1 Permanent Liquidity Crisis (￿ = 0) vs. Temporary Liquidity Crisis (￿ = 1:5)
V cr
B ST Spread (bps) LT Spread (bps)
Baseline ￿
cr
H = ￿H = 1 87.11 20.22 186.33
￿
cr
H > ￿H perm. temp. perm. temp. perm. temp.
￿
cr
H = 2 88.22 87.96 41.10 37.84 215.58 195.45
￿
cr
H = 3 89.32 88.84 64.77 55.66 248.55 200.34
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